This paper examines the relation between liquidity demands of corporate sector and investment decisions. It shows that the liquidity asset holding has two impacts on investments. First, the liquidity can absorb a liquidity shock and helps to continue a necessary project. Second, it helps to continue an undesirable project and decreases the incentive of firms. This negative aspect is quite similar to the soft budget constraint. According to these two impacts, firms must keep the optimal level of liquidity at the time of liquidity shock. If the value of liquidity asset fluctuates, however, it will become difficult to control the liquidity level. Hence the fluctuation of asset prices may decrease the aggregate investments even though all agents are risk neutral. Furthermore the paper also examines the impacts of investments on liquidity asset prices, and endogenously determines both asset prices and investment levels. It shows that even if the asset prices are expected to rise perfectly, aggregate investments should decrease as long as the growth rate of the prices is too high. It also examines the role of credit line offered by financial intermediaries.
This paper examines the relation between liquidity and investment decisions of corporate sector. Keeping liquidity assets holding appropriately is an important element for corporate financial management, and the demand for liquidity asset in corporate sector is important in financial markets. In the economic literature, however, the liquidity demand of corporate sector has not been examined very much. In the literature of macro economy, a large empirical literature supports the hypothesis that liquidity is an important factor for investment decisions 1 . In that literature, however, the theoretical explanation about this relationship is not yet derived clearly. Furthermore, in that literature, the value of liquidity assets is given, and only the effects of liquidity level on investment decisions are explored. However, those asset values must be affected by the activity of corporate sector. This paper will make clear, therefore, the interrelation between asset prices and investment decisions. We will show in this paper that the amount of liquidity holding affects the incentive of entrepreneurs and possible investment levels. The fluctuation of asset pricing should decrease the investment level even though all investors are risk neutral. It will be also shown that liquidity holding of some firms may raise the asset prices too high and may course to promote inefficient investments of other firms.
Recently, the importance of liquidity demand of corporate sector has been explored theoretically by Tirole(1997, 1998) . They have examined not only the liquidity demand of corporate sector and also the supply side of liquidity. Then they
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have derived a new theory about asset pricing. In the traditional asset pricing models, the cooperate sector is simple vain and it is hard to examine the effects of government policies. In their model, however, government policies directly affect the price of assets.
The spirit of this paper is close to this Holmstrom and Tirole model, although we will show more complicated interactions between asset pricing and investments, and will show a negative side of liquidity.
Similar to the model of Holmstrom and Tirole, in this paper the demand for liquidity is coming from the agency problem between investors and entrepreneurs. More precisely, there is a moral hazard problem of entrepreneurs. In order to solve the moral hazard, investors must pay a rent to the firm. This means the payment from the firm to the investors is limited and this limitation generates an under-investment problem. 2 If there is a possibility of liquidity shock and the firms have to do additional investments, this problem becomes important. Since the profit that can deliver to the investors is limited by the moral hazard problem, the additional investments may not be implemented since the investors cannot expect sufficient return from the additional investments. To avoid such liquidity problems, firms have to retain liquidity assets to absorb the liquidity shock in the future. By holding liquidity assets, the firms can implement the initial projects. This point is a positive aspect of the liquidity asset holding pointed out by Holmstrom and Tirole(1998) .
Keeping liquidity assets in a firm, however, also has a negative aspect about the incentive of entrepreneurs. Even if a project becomes less productive and it should be 7KLV ORJLF LV DOVR VLPLODU WR *UHHQZDOG 6WLJOLW] DQG :HLVV RU 0\HUV DQG
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shut down, entrepreneurs can continue the project by using the liquidity asset. In other words, the liquidity asset helps to bailout the project. This aspect must decrease the incentive of entrepreneurs since it raises the gain from low effort choice. In order to make clear this point, we formulate two types of liquidity shocks. One is the ex ante shock that occurs before the choice of effort and the other is ex post shock that occurs after the choice of effort. At the ex post shock there is no incentive problem. The response to the ex post shock, however, affects the incentive of entrepreneurs. If the firm has sufficient liquidity, it can finance the additional investment coming from the ex post shock. Then the project is not terminated even though it should be shut down at the ex post shock, and this continuation may give a negative effect for the incentive of entrepreneurs.
This negative aspect of liquidity asset holding is similar to the soft budget constraint problems (Kornai(1986) ). As Dewatripont and Maskin(1995) have pointed out, the soft budget constraint is an incentive problem and inability to commit not to bailout ex ante is the main reason. In our situation, the liquidity asset holding makes it difficult to commit to terminate the project for the ex post shock and this generates the incentive problems. Moreover, this negative aspect is also related to the free-cash-flow problem that was pointed out by Jensen(1986) and Stulz(1990) . Jensen (1986) In section 2, we will explain the basic model and in section 3, we explain the simple case in which there is only the ex ante shock. In section 4, we introduce the possibility of ex post liquidity shock and examine the relation between the value of liquidation asset and the optimal investment level. In section 5, we shows that the fluctuation of asset value generates a problem and high variance of asset price decreases the investment level. In section 6 we present a general equilibrium model to determine asset prices and investment levels endogenously. In section 7 we examine the role of credit line, and in section 8 we present some discussions.
We consider the following simple model where there are three types of agents, firms, investors, and financial intermediaries. All agents are risk neutral and we assume the investors have the following simple utility function.
(1)
By this assumption, we exclude the liquidity demand of investors. At each period, consumers receive sufficiently large endowments to finance necessary investments but they cannot sell claims on their future endowments. This simplification is used to highlight on the key point of our argument as Holmstrom and Tirole(1998) : The possibility of moral hazard by firms(entrepreneurs) generates the liquidity demands.
Each firm has a same investment opportunity at t = 0. It make an investment I at t = 0, with considering the possibility of liquidity shocks at t = 1 or t = 3. The investment will generate R if the project succeeds and 0 if it fails. Since each firm only has A( < I), it has to gather at least (I -A) for the investment.
We assume there is a moral hazard problem at t = 2. An entrepreneur can choose high effort e H or low effort e L , but this effort choice is unobservable to investors. If an entrepreneur chooses e H , the probability of success will be P H and it will become P L if he/she chooses e L . On the other hand, the entrepreneur gets the private non-pecuniary benefit B by choosing e L . We assume the following relation is satisfied.
(2)
This means that e H is socially desirable. Entrepreneurs, however, may have an incentive
to choose e L when he/she cannot seize the all realized gain R.
The key point of our argument is the possibility of liquidity shock at t = 1 and t = 3.
We assume that the firm that faces the liquidity shock has to add investments. If the firm cannot implement these additional investments, the project must be shut down and the profit becomes zero. At t = 1, the liquidity shock occurs with probability s and a firm facing this shock must additionally invest k (k is exogenous). We call this liquidity shock "ex ante liquidity shock". At t = date 4, a firm which chose e L faces the "ex post liquidity shock" with probability u. The firm faces this shock must additionally invest f (f is also exogenous). The assumption that only the firms that choose eL will face the ex post liquidity shock is used for simplifying the explanation. Even if we change the assumption and assume that even the high effort firms will face the "ex post shock", our results are not affected.
We summarize the sequence of decisions. At t = 0 the initial investment is implemented and the contract between firms and investors are determined. At t = 1, the ex ante liquidity shock occurs with probability s and whether the project is shut down or not is determined. At t = 2, entrepreneurs choose e H or e L and this choice affects the probability that firms realize R. At t = 3, the ex post liquidity shock occurs with probability u only when the entrepreneur chose e L , and the project is shut down if the additional investment is not implemented. At t = 4, the profit is realized.
To make our argument interesting, we assume that the project has a positive (expected) net present value if the firm chooses e H , but it has a negative (expected) net present value if it chooses e L .
Assumption 1:
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This assumption also means that the project is not realized if the entrepreneur cannot show that he/she will surely choose the high effort level.
Simple case: no ex post liquidity shock
First, we examine the incentive of entrepreneurs when there is no possibility of ex post liquidity shock, that is u = 0. In order to check the incentive problem at t = 2, let define the payment from a firm to investors is R .
If an entrepreneur chooses e
H , R will be realized with probability P H . Therefore, the expected gain of the entrepreneur who has chosen e H is (3)
On the other hand, if the entrepreneur chooses e L , R will be realized only with probability P L but she/he can get the private benefit B. Thus the expected gain for the entrepreneur who has chosen e L is
From (3) and (4) This situation is similar to the soft budget constraint problem. As Dewatripont and Maskin(1995) have pointed out, the soft budget constraint is an incentive problem and inability to commit to no bailout ex ante is the main reason. This situation is also related to the free cash flow problem pointed out by Jensen(1986) , which says too much cash flow makes an incentive for managers to invest unprofitable projects. In our situation, the liquidity asset holding makes it difficult to commit to terminate the project for the ex post shock and this generates the incentive problem of entrepreneurs. The important point is that the liquidity asset holding is useful for the ex ante liquidity shock.
Therefore there is a trade-off. The liquidity asset holding has a negative impact and positive impact on the realization of the investment.
In order to highlight on this incentive problem of entrepreneur, we assume the following assumption.
Assumption 2: Although the continuation or termination of the project is endogenously determined, we first check the incentive problem of entrepreneurs when the continuation or termination is exogenously given.
Ex post shock with continuation
The possibility of ex post liquidity shock affects the gain of entrepreneur who chose e L , and thus affects the maximum possible payment to implement the high effort level e H . First we derive the maximum possible payment R under the cases where the additional investment will be implemented under the ex post liquidity shock.
To implement e H , R must satisfy the following condition.
The left hand side is the expected gain when the entrepreneur chooses e H . The right hand side is the expected gain when he/she chooses e L . If the ex post liquidity shock does not occur (this probability is 1 -u), he/she can get the promised share ( ) R R − and the private benefit B. Under the ex post shock, however, he/she pays out all expected gain to implement the additional investment. Because, contrary to the cases of ex ante shock, there is no incentive problem any more at t = 3, the firm can promise to pay out all R. Thus the entrepreneur expects to get only the private benefit B under the ex post shock.
From this (10), we have the maximum possible payment R
If the entrepreneur has sufficient liquidity asset, he/she can use this asset for the additional investment and he/she may not have to pay out R. In such cases, however, the left hand side of (10) becomes higher. Thus the maximum possible payment becomes lower than R C if entrepreneurs have liquidity assets.
Ex post shock with termination
Next we check the incentive problem of an entrepreneur when the project is terminated under the ex post liquidity shock. In this situation, the maximum possible payment R must satisfy the following condition to implement e
This condition is similar to (10). In this case, however, the project is terminated when the ex post liquidity shock occurs. Thus the entrepreneur can get the private gain B only with probability (1-u).
From (12), we get the following maximum possible payment with termination, R S ,
By comparing (11) and (13), we can see that R R S C > . This means that the maximum possible payment increases by terminating the project under the ex post liquidity shock.
In other words, an entrepreneur can promise to pay more if he/she can commit by himself/herself to terminate the project when the ex post liquidity shock occurs.
In this model, the continuation decision is endogenous. If the entrepreneur has sufficient liquidity asset, he/she can continue the project even under the ex post shock.
Furthermore he/she has an incentive to continue the project because of the private gain B. Thus holding too much liquidity holding tends to continue the project even under the ex post shock and has a negative impact on the maximum possible payment. In the next subsection, we will make clear this point.
Liquidity asset holding and optimal investment level
In this sub-section, we examine whether the project is terminated or not under the ex post liquidity shock. Since an entrepreneur can get the private gain B by continuing the project, he/she will choose the continuation as long as he/she can implement the additional investment. Thus the value of the liquidity asset which the firm has is important for the continuation decision and the maximum possible payoff.
Moreover, whether the maximum possible payment is sufficient for the initial investment cost or not is another important factor. In order to highlight on the soft budget constraint problem, we assume that Next we examine the case in which L X k + f -P L R. In this case, the liquidity value is sufficient for the additional investment for the ex post shock, even if the firm paid the additional investment for the ex ante shock 6 . It follows that the firm cannot commit to terminate the project for the ex post shock. Thus the firm is only possible to pay out
, the situation becomes different. As long as the ex ante shock occurs, a firm uses the liquidation asset sufficiently for the ex ante shock.
Thus the liquidation value becomes too low for the ex post shock and the project should
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be terminated under the ex post shock. If the ex ante shock does not occur, however, the firm has too much liquidity asset at t = 3. Then the firm will continue the project even under the ex post shock as long as L > f -P L R. Thus the firm cannot promise to pay out R S with probability (1-u). To make clear this point we assume here that
This assumption is satisfied as long as R C or s is sufficiently low. Under this assumption, the firm cannot promise to pay out sufficient return if L >f -P L R. Therefore,
this project cannot be realized for any L.
Proposition 1:
, the project is implemented only when the value of liquidation
This proposition means that holding too much or too little liquidity asset is bad for implementing the project. However, the best strategy for a firm is simple as long as there is no uncertainty about the value of liquidity assets. It is the best strategy for a firm
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to keep the liquidity asset in the range k P R L f P R H S L − < < − . The value of liquidity asset fluctuates, however, a firm cannot control the liquidation value at t = 1.
Since the value of liquidation asset at t = 1 is important for implementing the project, this uncontrollability generates a serious problem. We will explain this problem in the next section.
Fluctuation of liquidity asset value
In this section we consider the cases where the value of liquidity asset fluctuates over time. In those cases, firms cannot control the value of holding liquidity asset perfectly.
Thus there is a possibility that the liquidity asset at t = 1 does not take the proper value to realize the sufficient payment. For the later explanation we define
Let suppose that the value of liquidity asset fluctuates at t = 1 and if the value of liquidity asset at t = 0 is L, the value at t = 1will take As long as m is small, the liquidation asset will be in the L* range and it works properly to responding the liquidity shocks. If m is sufficiently large, however, the liquidation value cannot be in the range of L* and the firm is unable to promise to pay sufficient return. More precisely, we get the following proposition.
Proposition 2:
, the holding of liquidity asset does not work well and the firm cannot realize the project.
This proposition means the liquidity asset does not work properly if the disturbance of the asset value is sufficiently high. In other words, the variance of asset price is important even though all investors are risk neutral. The total investment level should be decreased by an increase of the variance. This means that the policy to decrease the asset price should be meaningful. This point will be examined in the later section. In this situation, the expected net capital gain is positive, but keeping this asset as the liquidity asset does not contribute to implement the project if éis sufficiently large.
This result has an important implication for macro economic problems. Suppose some firms have the equity of a firm as the liquidity asset. The above result shows that the increase of the stock price is not so large, this stock works as the liquidity asset and the investments of those firms should be increased. If the stock price tends to go up so quickly, however, it will not work as the liquidity asset properly and the investments should be depressed. Thus this result is potentially useful to explain economic fluctuation problems. Furthermore, if there are several types of asset which can be used for the liquidity asset, firms tends to use more safety (i.e. low variance) asset. Thus the price of safety asset tends to be high even if all investors are risk neutral.
General Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we extend the previous arguments to a general equilibrium framework and examine how the fluctuation of liquidity asset value occurs. We assume here that only claims issued by firms can be used to transfer wealth from one period to next. In other words, the claims are only used for the liquidity demand. This means the fluctuation of firms' value generates the fluctuation of liquidity value. Thus aggregate shocks which affect the firms' value may generates the inefficiency of investments. In this section we examine this problem carefully.
In order to set up a general equilibrium model, we suppose that there is a continuum of firms with unit mass. Each firm has the same technology as assumed in the previous sections and faces the possibility of liquidity shocks as explained in the previous sections. We assume each firm has the market portfolio (that is, the symmetric combination of all equities) as the liquidity asset in order to decrease the variance of asset value,.
First we examine the total value of the market portfolio. At t = 0, the expected value of each firm is
If the stochastic variable s of each firm is independent, the total value of market portfolio after the ex ante liquidity shock is also (16). If there is aggregate shocks, however, the total value of market portfolio must fluctuate. Let define the value of
is the parameter of aggregate shock and it is distributed in the range of [ min , max ] so as to satisfy dL d / ω > 0 . We assume here that each firm is symmetric and thus any other kinds of portfolio cannot decrease the variance of this market portfolio. In this situation, the value of liquidity asset must fluctuates at t = 1 since the value of the market portfolio fluctuates.
As pointed out by Holmstrom and Tirole(1998) 
min max L L ω ω is not included in the range L*, each firm cannot control the liquidity value appropriately and the initial investments cannot be realized as explained in the previous section. This mean that private claims are insufficient tool for the liquidity shocks even if the total value of the market portfolio is always sufficiently high.
Rather too high value generates the problem since it promotes the undesirable investment for the ex post shock.
Moreover, we can see that the high value of the market portfolio is partially coming from the implementation of additional investment for the ex ante shock. Therefore the liquidity holding for the ex ante shock may harm the total economy, although such liquidity holding is meaningful for each individual firm. The intuitive story of this logic is as follows. By holding the liquidity asset, each firm that faces the ex ante liquidity shock can accommodate the shock and implement the additional investments. As a result of the additional investment, the equity value of those firms does not decrease and the value of the market portfolio becomes high. In this sense the liquidity asset is working well. This high equity prices, however, generates too much liquidity holding and makes it possible to accommodate the ex post liquidity shock. Hence if some firms failed to accommodate the ex ante shock, it might be better for the economy. The value of market portfolio does not go up so much and firms do not implement the inefficient additional investment for the ex post shock. In summary, this story shows that the liquidity asset holding may promote desirable investments but it also generates the boom of financial markets and may allow inefficient investments. If investors initially expect this scenario, they do not invest sufficiently and the initial investments should be decreased.
In the previous sections, we have assumed that a firm keeps a liquidity asset for the liquidity shocks. As explored by Holmstrom and Tirole(1998) , however, firms need not have a asset if financial intermediaries offers credit lines. Instead of keeping the liquidity asset, a firm makes a contract to a financial intermediary and uses the credit line if there is the liquidity shock. Under the liquidity shock, the additional investment only generates negative rate of return since the firm cannot promise to pay out all possible gain. This means that the credit line generates negative profits to the intermediary. Thus the firm has to pay some credit line fee at the date of contracts.
There are several types of contracts to implement the project. A simple way is as follows. A firm makes a contract that allows using the amount of credit line L. Even though the firm need not pay any interest rate when uses the credit line, but at the time of contract the firm pays L to the financial intermediary for the credit line fee. The firm gathers the cost for the fee from investors. In other words, the firm must gather just same amount of fund from investor as the case of liquidity asset holding. In this case, however, the fund L goes to the financial intermediary instead of purchasing of liquidity asset.
One advantage of using the credit line is that the amount of credit line does not fluctuate over time. At the contracts, the maximum amount of credit line is usually determined, and it does not change over time. Hence, as long as the initial level of credit line is determined properly, the credit line helps to realize the project.
If other valuables fluctuate over time, however, this advantage of credit line may disappear. For example, let suppose k will fluctuate at t = 1and there is uncertainty about k at t = 0. In this case, the necessary amount of credit line also fluctuates, and thus the credit line can be used for the ex post shock will fluctuate even though the contracted credit line is constant. Hence the merit of credit line in this aspect is not so robust.
Financial intermediaries, however, may have informational advantage. In this paper
we have assumed that investors cannot distinguish between the ex post shock and ex ante shock. Then firms can use the liquidity asset even for the ex post shock, and the soft budget constraint problem arises. If financial intermediaries can distinguish those two shocks, therefore, they can solve the soft budget constraint problem by prohibiting using the credit line for the ex post shock.
Recently Japanese government has decided to allow the credit line contracts among Japanese firms and banks, although there has been the credit line contracts informally.
Since those contracts are informal, it has been hard for banks to commit to allow the credit line. In this sense, this formal allowance is beneficial for the Japanese Economy.
In actual economy, however, it is hard to distinguish between ex ante shock and ex post shock. If so, the allowance of the credit line might decrease the total investment level of Japan.
Discussion
]]The arguments in the previous sections have shown that the fluctuation of asset has negative effects on investments. We have shown that even if the price is expected to rise, this negative effect works. One way to solve this problem may be government intervention. The stabilization of liquidity asset price can be obtained through market interventions or direct supply of liquidity assets (such as government bonds). By adjusting the supply level of liquidity, government can control the investment levels indirectly.
In this paper we have assumed for simplicity the investment level I is exogenous. We can easily extend this model, however, to the cases where investment level is endogenously determined. In such cases the investment level changes along the change of maximum possible payments. Even such cases, therefore, there exists the underinvestment effect because of the fluctuation of asset prices.
Moreover, the examination of this paper has used a simple four period's model. The extension of this examination to more general versions of dynamic models would be interesting. By using an infinite horizon model, for example, we can derive the dynamic of asset prices more rigorously. Then we can make clearer the dynamic interactions between the dynamics of asset prices and investment decisions. Thus this kind of extensions should be done in a future research.
